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Do corporate insiders trade on future stock price crash risk? 
 
Abstract  
We explore whether firm managers trade on future stock price crash risk. This depends on 
managers’ ability to assess future crash risk, and on whether the expected payoff is greater than 
the expected costs associated with potential reputation loss and litigation risk. We find that 
insider sales are positively associated with future crash risk, which is consistent with managers’ 
trading on crash risk for personal gain. We also find that managers take advantage of high 
information opacity to pursue crash-risk-based insider sales more aggressively, but are less able 
to capitalize on this in the case of financial constraints or post-SOX.  
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1 Introduction 
The literature documents that managers tend to trade on the basis of their advance knowledge of 
corporate bad news at the expense of uninformed outside investors (e.g., Ke et al. 2003; Dechow 
et al. 2016). Insiders’ motivation for such information-based sales is to avoid personal losses 
associated with the announcement of negative firm news which is information previously 
unknown by outsiders.  
In contrast, our paper examines whether corporate insiders trade on future stock price crash 
risk, rather than on specific bad news events that insiders know about exactly via their private 
information. It cannot be taken for granted that managers can recognize future stock price crash 
risk as well, which requires their ability to extrapolate from their inside knowledge and information. 
Thus, ex ante, it is unclear if insiders are able to anticipate stock price crash risk. Furthermore, 
whether insiders will actually trade on future crash risk also depends on how they perceive the 
likelihood of whether the payoff from such strategic trading will be greater than the costs 
associated with potential reputation loss and threat of litigation. Such perceived benefits vis-à-vis 
costs, due to the unique nature of crash risk, are distinct from those from trading on corporate 
events, especially when looking at crash-risk-based insider sales made based on a relatively long 
horizon. For these reasons, whether insider sales are associated with future stock price crash risk 
is an important, open question worthy of exploring. 
Extant studies (e.g., Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009) attribute stock price crash risk to 
managerial hoarding of bad news. In particular, managers have incentives to hide bad news for 
career and short-term compensation reasons (Jin and Myers 2006; Kothari et al. 2009; Baginski et 
2 
 
al. 2018). Nonetheless, there exists an upper limit where it becomes too costly or difficult for 
managers to further withhold the bad news, but usually they cannot anticipate when this point will 
arrive (He 2015). Once this threshold point is reached, it will not be possible to contain all the 
stockpiled bad news, leading to an abrupt, dramatic collapse in stock price, that is, a stock price 
crash (Chen et al. 2001; Hutton et al. 2009).1 Accordingly, stock price crash risk refers to the 
likelihood of a stock price crash due to bad news hoarding (e.g., Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 
2009).2 Such bad news withheld could be of any kind that, once released, would lead to a stock 
price fall.  
On the other hand, if corporate bad news is released to the market on a timely basis and the 
stock price falls, there will be no stock mispricing and no incentive for informed insider trades. 
Put differently, informed insider sales are likely only when the disclosure of bad news is delayed 
with stock prices consequently overstated; nonetheless, it is difficult to empirically identify 
whether a particular piece of bad news had been withheld before being released. Therefore, 
compared with various corporate bad news events studied in the prior insider-trading literature, 
stock price crash risk provides a powerful, generalized setting in which to examine managerial 
motives behind opportunistic insider sales.  
Though managers usually cannot predict exactly the point at which their firm’s stock price 
 
1 A stock price crash is conceptually different from an ordinary drop in stock price. Stocks with prices declining 
gradually over time may have very low crash risk. 
2 Bad news hoarding is usually regarded as the fundamental driver of stock price crash risk (e.g., Chen et al. 
2001; Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a, 2011b; He 2015); the more bad news corporate 
insiders hoard, the higher the crash risk of their firm. Bad news events per se would trigger stock price crashes 
only when the following three conditions all hold: (i) the bad news is severe enough; (ii) the market cannot 
anticipate such bad news in advance; (iii) insiders do not warn the market of the bad news. Hence, bad news 
events do not necessarily lead to stock price crashes, even though on some occasions they do; it is worth further 
noting that, once bad news is revealed to the public, stock price crash risk will become lower as the stock price 
declines.  
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will actually collapse, they may still be able to assess the likelihood of such an event. The aim of 
our study is to link insider sales with future stock price crash risk. Specifically, we investigate 
whether managers’ anticipation of future stock price crash risk leads them to sell down their firm 
stocks.  
Insider sales can also be driven by insiders’ liquidity needs or for portfolio diversification 
purposes (Lustgarten and Mande 1995; Carpenter and Remmers 2001; Frankel and Li 2004), and 
it is difficult for investors to distinguish information-motivated sales from liquidity- or 
diversification-motivated sales (Beneish and Vargus 2002). As a result, legal and reputational risks 
arising from insider sales are expected to be low, thus providing insiders with incentives to engage 
in opportunistic stock sales. Furthermore, since future crash risk is uncertain by nature, it is hard 
for outsiders to identify insider trades that are based on future crash risk. Therefore, we predict 
that insiders have an incentive to sell their stocks in anticipation of high future crash risk. Our 
results confirm this expectation. 
Our empirical analysis covers stock sales made by top managers (i.e., officers and directors) 
of a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1993-2013. Because insiders tend to trade on varied 
bad news events, we control for future stock returns and future trading volume, along with a wide 
array of determinants of insider sales, in all our regression analyses. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
we find strong evidence that insider sales are associated with 15-month-ahead crash risk. Our 
findings are robust to different measures of crash risk and potential correlated omitted variable(s). 
We also demonstrate that reverse causality, i.e., that insider selling might affect stock price crash 
risk, is unlikely to explain our results. We conduct further analysis of the positive association 
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between insider trades and future stock price crash risk, and find that this association is weaker for 
financially constrained firms, stronger for firms that have a high degree of information asymmetry 
with outsiders, and less pronounced after the implementation of SOX.  
Our study contributes to both insider trading literature and crash risk literature. The literature 
on informed insider trading finds that insiders tend to trade on their foreknowledge of a wide range 
of bad news events.3 We believe our study advances this stream of literature along the following 
four dimensions:  
First, our paper extends this literature by linking insider sales directly with the future stock 
price crash risk that results from bad news hoarding. In contrast to previous work which mainly 
examines insider trades made within two quarters ahead of bad news events, we focus on the risk 
of a stock price crash as anticipated by insiders on a relatively longer horizon, and illuminate the 
underlying motivation behind informed trades made based on crash risk.4 
Second, the prior literature on informed insider trades explores a range of corporate news 
events known exactly by managers. By contrast, we focus on stock price crash risk per se, which 
 
3 These include bankruptcies (e.g., Gosnell et al. 1992; Seyhun and Bradley 1997), dividend announcements 
(e.g., John and Lang 1991), SEC enforcement actions (e.g., Beneish 1999; Johnson et al. 2009; Thevenot 2012), 
disclosures of internal control weaknesses (Skaife et al. 2013), public disclosures of negative Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters (Dechow et al. 2016), and earnings disappointments (e.g., 
Beneish and Vargus 2002; Ke et al. 2003; Darrough and Rangan 2005; Badertscher et al. 2011; Billings and 
Cedergren 2015), among others. 
4 There are two reasons why we focus on insider sales in this study. First, a stock price increase as a result of 
insider purchases would only result in opportunity costs, not real damages, to an investor who fails to buy the 
stocks that had been purchased by insiders (Niehaus and Roth 1999; Cheng and Lo 2006). In contrast, when 
insider sales are followed by a price decline especially a stock price crash, outside investors holding stocks of 
the firm would suffer substantive losses. Therefore, in general, investors are much concerned about insider sales, 
especially those made on the basis of future crash risk, rather than about insider purchases. Second, insider 
purchases are far fewer than insider sales in practice because of the prevalent practice of companies granting 
stocks and stock options to corporate insiders. Further, insiders can sell their own stocks on a relatively long 
horizon in advance of their anticipated future crash risk. This selling strategy would subject insiders to relatively 
low litigation risk and is thus more likely to be utilized by them for fulfilling self-serving incentives. Therefore, 
insider sales made in a longer-horizon anticipation of future crash risk should deserve more attention and scrutiny 
by investors, which is the focus of our study. 
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managers need to make efforts to deduce before trading on it. Furthermore, managers’ perceived 
benefits from trading on future crash risk vis-à-vis the perceived costs should inherently differ to 
those from trading on future corporate events which in themselves constitute insider information. 
In developing our hypotheses, our study adds to the insider trading literature by providing insights 
into the benefits vis-à-vis costs associated with informed insider trades.  
Third, stock price crash risk provides a more powerful, generalized setting than the extant 
insider trading literature to examine the incentives for insider sales. This is first because 
substantive stock-price falls will not necessarily follow the particular bad news events examined 
in the prior insider-trading research if the market is warned about, or is able to anticipate, these 
events in advance. On the other hand, if bad news is released timely to the public and is equitably 
known to both insiders and outsiders, no informed insider sales will take place despite the stock 
price decline associated with the bad news. Crash risk, the risk of a dramatic stock price plunge, 
potentially results from managerial withholding of a wide range of adverse corporate information. 
Moreover, the payoff to insiders from trading on the risk of an abrupt, significant stock-price 
decline is likely to be considerably larger than the payoff to stock sales made based on an ordinary 
stock price drop. By showing that insider sales are positively associated with future stock price 
crash risk, we are able to substantiate the prevalence of such opportunistic managerial trading 
behavior.  
Fourth, to the extent that insiders can influence whether, when, and how corporate news is 
released, insider trades and the future news events that managers trade on are endogenously 
determined, which the literature on informed insider trades arguably does not take into account. 
6 
 
Our study explicitly acknowledges this endogeneity concern and seeks to mitigate it.  
Our study also contributes to the extant crash risk literature. This literature (e.g., Francis et al. 
2016; Lee and Wang 2017; Kao et al. 2020) focuses predominantly on the determinants of stock 
price crash risk, with very little attention paid to the implications of crash-risk exposure for 
managers’ decision-making. We fill this void in the literature by showing how firm crash-risk 
exposure leads to decisions by insiders to sell down their stocks to extract private benefits.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop our testable hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data sources and variable measures. Section 4 presents the research design. 
Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 conducts additional analysis, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2 Hypothesis development 
2.1 The association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk 
Prior research shows that insiders actively trade on their foreknowledge of future bad news events. 
For instance, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) find insider sales occur prior to the filing date of 
bankruptcy petitions. John and Lang (1991) document how insiders in growth firms tend to sell 
their shares prior to dividend initiation announcements that signal reduced growth opportunities. 
Skaife et al. (2013) find that the profitability of insider selling is particularly high in the years 
leading up to disclosures of material internal control weaknesses. Beneish (1999), Johnson et al. 
(2009), Thevenot (2012), and Agrawal and Cooper (2015) find that insiders sell down substantially 
more of their stocks before revelations of accounting irregularities. Dechow et al. (2016) show that 
insider sales are significantly higher prior to the public release of SEC comment letters relating to 
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aggressive revenue recognition. Ke et al. (2003) find that insider sales increase in advance of a 
break in a string of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings. Collectively, this strand of 
literature suggests that insiders can foresee future bad news events, and that they trade intensively 
to exploit their information advantage. To the extent that managers are competent, we posit that 
insiders can appraise the likelihood of a future stock price crash for purpose of selling down their 
stock holdings to avoid the associated monetary losses.   
Managers, who run corporate businesses and possess varied types of private information, have 
discretion on how to publicly disclose their firm’s operational status, business strategies, risks, 
performance, prospects, and any other value-relevant information. They can disclose this set of 
inside information strategically so that outside investors will find it difficult to assess future crash 
risk in the same way insiders can. Consequently, asymmetry of information about future crash risk 
arises between insiders and outsiders, thereby making crash-risk-based insider sales beneficial for 
insiders but harmful to outsider investors.  
On the other hand, the risks and costs associated with crash-risk-based insider sales are likely 
to be low for insiders for two reasons. First, insider sales can be attributed either to insiders’ 
exploitation of negative private information (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Kallunki et al. 2018) 
or to their liquidity or investment portfolio diversification needs (Lustgarten and Mande 1995; 
Carpenter and Remmers 2001; Frankel and Li 2004). It is often difficult for investors to distinguish 
information-motivated sales from liquidity- or diversification-motivated sales (Beneish and 
Vargus 2002); even if investors can, insiders may still defend themselves against reputational and 
legal risks by arguing that their information-driven sales were not informationally motivated. As 
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such, the expected costs to insiders in making informed stock sales are low. Second, due to a firm’s 
changing external environment and internal business operations, the extent of future stock price 
crash risk could be of uncertainty even to corporate insiders. Trading on a piece of information 
that is, by nature, uncertain entails relatively low litigation risk for insiders. Therefore, managers 
should have incentives to engage in insider sales based on future crash risk, given that the expected 
costs will likely be lower than the expected payoff. Such a payoff (i.e., losses avoided by selling 
stocks in advance) is potentially more attractive to insiders compared to the payoff from stock 
sales made based on an ordinary stock-price decline. These arguments lead to our first hypothesis 
stated in the alternative form as follows: 
H1  Insider sales are positively associated with future stock price crash risk. 
The more strongly insider sales are positively associated with future stock price crash risk (i.e., 
when insider sales vary to a larger extent in response to future crash risk), the more pronounced 
the crash-risk-based insider sales are. In the next section, we further examine the cross-sectional 
variation in the crash-risk-based insider sales.  
 
2.2 Cross-sectional variation in the association between insider sales and future crash risk 
Financial constraints refer to frictions that prevent a firm from funding its desired investments 
(Lamont et al. 2001). Financially constrained firms require external funds to meet their investment 
needs. Prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Jeng et al. 2003; Fidrmuc et al. 2006) 
document that insider selling could by itself convey unfavorable information to the market, leading 
to a fall in share price. Because of the information effect of insider sales, financially constrained 
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firms, if involved in insider sales, will find it more difficult to raise external capital for investments 
and operations (Campello et al. 2010; Ataullah et al. 2014), and consequently, will become more 
financially constrained. Thus, the costs for managers to pursue crash-risk-based insider sales are 
expected to be greater in the case of financial constraints. Confronted with financial constraints, 
insiders should refrain from trading on future stock price crash risk. This leads to our second 
hypothesis: 
H2a  The positive association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk is less 
pronounced for firms that face financial constraints. 
Nonetheless, if insiders do not care about their long-term compensation and career prospects, 
they will not worry about the increased financial constraints resulting from insider sales. Under 
this premise, higher crash risk, which likely arises due to exacerbated financial constraints (He and 
Ren 2020), will induce higher insider selling. Thus, we allow for the opposite hypothesis as follows: 
H2b  The positive association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk is more 
pronounced for firms that face financial constraints. 
Insider trading is fundamentally driven by insiders’ information advantage over outside 
investors. Theory (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985; 
Huddart and Ke 2007) suggests that the greater the magnitude of information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders, the higher the trading profits insiders can reap from their stock trades. 
Consistent with this notion, Frankel and Li (2004) find evidence that the association between 
insider sales and subsequent returns, which is employed as a proxy for the profitability of insider 
trades, is weaker for firms that experience an increase in financial statement informativeness and 
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in analyst following. Similarly, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that firm size, an inverse measure 
of information asymmetry, is negatively associated with the extent to which insider trades predict 
future stock returns. Aboody and Lev (2000) predict and find that an increase in information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, resulting from research and development activities, 
allows insiders to gain higher profits from their stock trades. Given the higher trading profits that 
insiders can earn from firms with high information asymmetry, insiders in such firms should have 
stronger motives to trade aggressively in anticipation of high future crash risk. Our third hypothesis 
thus follows: 
H3  The positive association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk is stronger 
for firms with greater information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was implemented in 2002 with the objective of improving 
corporate governance and financial reporting quality, and appears generally to have achieved this 
goal. For example, the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts has increased (Arping and Sautner 
2013), and earnings quality is enhanced (Iliev 2010), both consistent with SOX rendering 
corporate information less opaque. Similarly, by mandating management evaluation, and 
independent audit, of internal control effectiveness, SOX has lowered information risk and cost of 
equity for firms (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009).  
We predict that SOX would have reduced opportunistic crash-risk-driven insider sales for the 
following reasons. First, separation of ownership and control induces incentive misalignment 
between managers and shareholders, motivating managers to extract rents from shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). One route for managerial rent extraction is insider trading whereby 
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insiders (i.e., informed traders) profit at the expense of shareholders (i.e., uninformed traders) (e.g., 
Seyhun 1986; Fishman and Hagerty 1992; Bettis et al. 2000; Jagolinzer et al. 2011). Given that 
corporate governance is intended to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders, it follows 
that strong corporate governance should mitigate opportunistic insider sales that are detrimental 
to shareholders. In this vein, if SOX has enhanced corporate governance, insiders should be less 
likely to trade on future crash risk after the enforcement of SOX. 
Second, low information opacity reduces the profitability of insider trades (e.g., Kyle 1985; 
Huddart and Ke 2007). If SOX has improved disclosure transparency and financial reporting 
quality for firms, information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders should be lower. As a 
result, insiders would profit less from their informed trades, and accordingly, have weaker 
incentives to dispose of their stocks on the basis of their assessed future crash risk.  
Third, the legal and reputational costs associated with insider sales are expected to be greater 
post SOX, which thereby disincentivizes corporate insiders from engaging in crash-risk-based 
stock sales. Based on the above arguments, we expect SOX to have weakened insiders’ incentives 
to trade on future stock price crash risk, and establish our fourth hypothesis:  
H4  The positive association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk is weaker 
after the implementation of SOX.  
 
3 Sample and variable construction 
3.1 Data sources and sample 
Our insider trading data are obtained from the Thomson Financial Insider Research Services 
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Historical Files. We restrict our insider trading transactions to open market trades, exclusive of 
non-open market trades such as option grants, option exercises, dividend reinvestments, stock 
transfers among family members, and pension transactions (Huddart and Ke 2007; Huddart et al. 
2007).5 We further limit our insider trading transactions to those by officers and directors only, 
excluding those by non-officer employees who are unlikely to impact major corporate decisions.6 
For each firm, we sum all purchases and sales by managers in the fiscal years of interest to allow 
us to focus on the actions of the management team in aggregate.7 
We obtain our financial analyst data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
database. Other data are taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Compustat. Our sample period ranges from 1993 to 2013. We end our sample period in 2013 
because the institutional trading data required for constructing our dedicated institutional 
ownership variable are only available for us for the period before 2014.8 We restrict our sample 
to firms with the necessary data to allow us to construct the variables we need for our empirical 
tests. Our final sample for testing the association between insider sales and future stock price crash 
risk comprises 32,326 firm-year observations for 7,135 unique firms. Table 1 reports summary 
 
5 Compared with buying put options, timing stock sales could be a more flexible tool for insiders to avoid losses 
from potential stock price crashes. According to previous studies (e.g., Amin and Lee 1997; Hyland et al. 2003), 
firms with optioned stocks are fewer than those with non-optioned stocks, hence option trades by insiders are 
less prevalent than stock trades by insiders in the capital market. Thus, consistent with prior research (e.g., Cheng 
and Lo 2006; Huddart and Ke 2007; He and Marginson 2020), we focus on insiders’ stock trades in this paper.  
6 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use the insider trades by CEOs, CFOs, and chairmen of boards 
(namely, senior insiders) only. We do not compare trades by insiders, who are in different positions, in our 
empirical analysis because of likely sharing of inside information among the insiders.  
7 For a given firm in a fiscal year, some insiders might be selling while others might be buying. In this case, 
insider purchases are subtracted from insider sales to reflect the net direction of insider sales in that fiscal year. 
In so doing, we control for the confounding effects of insider purchases on our regression analysis in which 
insider selling is the dependent variable.  
8 We thank Brian Bushee for sharing the institutional investor classification data which we use to derive the 
variable for dedicated institutional stock ownership.  
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statistics for all the variables which are used in our hypothesis tests and defined in the Appendix. 
 
3.2 Measures of firm-specific stock price crash risk 
As with prior research (e.g., Chen et al. 2001; Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 
2011a, 2011b; Callen and Fang 2015; DeFond et al. 2015), we focus solely on firm-specific stock 
price crash risk; crash risk that is ascribed to market-wide factors is beyond the scope of this study. 
We employ three measures of stock price crash risk. The first is the likelihood of negative, extreme 
firm-specific weekly returns over a fiscal year (namely, crashrisk) as per Hutton et al. (2009). 
crashrisk equals 1 if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 
standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly return over a fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise.9 Our second crash risk measure (namely, ncskew) follows Chen et al. (2001) and is the 
negative third moment of each stock’s firm-specific weekly returns. The third measure of crash 
risk (duvol) is the down-to-up variance of firm-specific weekly returns as per Chen et al. (2001). 
duvol equals the standard deviation of “down”-week firm-specific weekly returns (scaled by the 
number of “down”-weeks minus one), divided by the standard deviation of “up”-week firm-
specific weekly returns (scaled by the number of “up”-weeks minus one) over a fiscal year. The 
firm-specific weekly returns measure used in calculating crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol follows 
Kim et al. (2011a), and is adjusted for market-wide factors. In line with prior literature on stock 
price crash risk (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a, 2011b; Callen and Fang 2015; DeFond et al. 
 
9 Our inferences for the hypothesis tests remain the same if we re-define the negative, extreme firm-specific 
weekly returns as being lower than the mean firm-specific weekly return by 3.1, or 3.3, standard deviations. We 
also obtain similar results when using the number of crash weeks over a fiscal year to measure crash risk. 
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2015), high values of crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol proxy for a high likelihood of a stock price 
crash. In anticipation of high stock price crash risk, insiders would have a tendency of selling their 
stocks to avoid monetary losses associated with a stock price crash. 
In line with Hutton et al. (2009), our main tests are based primarily on the crashrisk variable; 
the other two crash risk measures are used for robustness purposes. As reported in Table 1, the 
mean value of crashrisk is 0.1791, indicating that firm-specific stock price crash risk for a fiscal 
year amounts to 17.91%. This is close to that reported by Hutton et al. (2009) though they use a 
shorter sample period than we do. The correlation matrix (not reported for simplicity) reveals that 
crashrisk is highly, positively correlated with ncskew and duvol (0.411 and 0.392), respectively. 
 
3.3 Measures of insider sales 
Insiders are subject to an established legal jeopardy for selling immediately (e.g., within one 
quarter or less) before price-relevant events (e.g., Garfinkel 1997; Noe 1999; Huddart et al. 2007). 
Thus, we measure insider selling in a way such that its measurement window ends three months 
prior to the beginning of the year for which the crash risk variable (crashrisk) is measured. In 
particular, our insider sales variable (lnetsales) equals the natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume 
amount of net insider sales (i.e., insider sales minus insider purchases) made by all a firm’s 
directors and officers over a year ending three months prior to the beginning of the year for which 
the crash risk variables are measured, and equals 0 if the volume amount of net insider sales is 
negative.10 Part (a) of Figure 1 portrays the timeline for the crash risk and insider selling variables’ 
 
10 We get even stronger results in support of our hypotheses if we re-define the insider sales variable in a way 
that it is added with a negative sign when the volume amount of net insider sales is negative. All our results also 
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measurement windows. This shows how lnetsales is measured over the 12-month period (t-9/4, t-
5/4) ending one quarter before the crashrisk estimation period (t-1, t), where t denotes the end of 
the crash risk fiscal year.11 
 
4 Research methodology 
4.1 Multivariate test of the hypothesis H1 
To test the hypothesis H1, we employ the following pooled OLS regression model: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14
lnetsales crashrisk changeroa roa retvol  salesgrowth
                 optiong size btm qtrret tradevol leadqtrret
                 leadtradevol anacov laglnetsale
     
     
  
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + 15 16
17 18 19 20
s stdearnings ww
                 dedi SOX year-fixed effects industry-fixed effects
 
    
+ +
+ + + + +
    (1) 
The theme of the hypothesis test is to look at whether insiders’ anticipation of future crash risk 
motivates them to sell down their stocks in advance. The causality flow runs from future crash risk 
to insider sales. Thus, the dependent variable is lnetsales and the key independent variable is 
crashrisk, both of which are as defined previously. Prior studies that examine information-driven 
insider sales conduct multivariate analyses, in which the dependent variable is insider sales, and 
the key independent variable is future bad news events which proxy for insiders’ foreknowledge 
of future bad news events (e.g., Ke et al. 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005; Agrawal and Cooper 
2015; Dechow et al. 2016). Our regression model specification is akin to those used in these studies. 
In a similar way to prior research, we use future crash risk to proxy for insiders’ anticipation of 
 
hold if we use the dollar amount of net insider sales, or the volume or dollar amount of raw insider sales, to 
construct our insider selling variables.  
11 We do not separate routine insider trades from non-routine insider trades in our analysis. This is because in an 
attempt to make their trades appear non-opportunistic and “uninformed” to outside investors, insiders may 
engage in routine trades, instead of non-routine trades, to reduce detection risk and potential reputational and 
legal costs associated with informed insider sales (e.g., Amel-Zadeh et al. 2019; He and Marginson 2020). 
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future crash risk and as our key explanatory variable for insider sales.  
Insiders trading immediately (e.g., within one quarter or shorter) before price-relevant 
corporate events violate insider trading laws directly, and will trigger exceptionally high litigation 
risk (e.g., Garfinkel 1997; Huddart et al. 2007), compared with trading a longer time in advance. 
Therefore, in our main tests, we allow a 3-month interval between the measurement window of 
insider selling and that of crash risk.12 As such, on average, crash risk is measured 15 months 
ahead of insider sales. Based on the hypothesis H1, the coefficient on crashrisk should be positive 
and statistically significant at a conventional level. 
We include a broad set of control variables in the regression to mitigate potential correlated- 
omitted-variable(s) bias. As discussed in Section 2, information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders likely induces more insider sales, whilst financial constraints and the implementation of 
SOX likely reduce insider sales. Therefore, we control for information asymmetry (stdearnings), 
financial constraints (ww), and SOX (sox) in our regression model. Earnings volatility (stdearnings) 
is used as the proxy for information asymmetry, and is expected to be positively correlated with 
insider sales. For our measure of financial constraints, we employ Whited and Wu’s (2006) WW 
index. A high value of the WW index (ww) represents a high degree of financial constraints, and 
hence should be associated with reduced insider sales. 
Because high stock return volatility provides insiders with more room to exploit their 
information advantage and to profit from their stock trades, we control for stock return volatility 
(retvol), and expect it to be positively related to insider sales. Strong external monitoring restrains 
 
12 All the inferences for the tests of the hypotheses H1-H4 remain unchanged if we remove the three-month 
interval.  
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opportunistic informed trades. Hence, we control for analyst coverage (anacov) and dedicated 
institutional stock ownership (dedi). Higher analyst coverage and higher dedicated institutional 
ownership are likely to be associated with more intensive external monitoring (e.g., Chen et al. 
2007; Chen et al. 2015; He et al. 2019) and thus with less informed insider sales. We control for 
firm size (size) because insiders in large firms trade their stocks more actively (Lakonishok and 
Lee 2001). We also include the number of option grants (optiong), as Ofek and Yermack (2000) 
find that insiders sell more shares when granted more stock options. We include sales growth 
(salesgrowth) since Rozeff and Zaman (1998) find that insiders in growth firms sell down more of 
their stocks. Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find that insider trades are positively related to future 
earnings performance (a proxy for insiders’ superior knowledge about future cash flow 
realizations), positively associated with book-to-market ratio, and negatively related to recent 
returns (proxies for insiders’ contrarian beliefs). Hence, we control for return on assets (roa), 
change in return on assets (changeroa), book-to-market ratio (btm), and buy-and-hold stock returns 
(ret). We include these variables also because they capture firm performance and future prospect 
that are likely to be correlated with both insider sales and future crash risk.  
High trading volume is associated with a large difference in opinions among investors (Chen 
et al. 2001) and hence with a higher likelihood of stock mispricing. Since insiders have incentives 
to trade against mispricing, trading volume should be positively associated with insider trades. 
High trading volume is also associated with stock liquidity. The more liquid the stocks, the easier 
it is for insiders to dispose of their shares. We therefore include trading volume (tradevol) in our 
regression model and expect tradevol to be positively related to insider sales. The inclusion of ret 
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and tradevol in the regression also reduces any potential correlated-omitted-variable(s) bias 
induced by events (e.g., M&A) that influence firm fundamentals. ret and tradevol are measured in 
the same window as that of lnetsales, while the other foregoing control variables are measured in 
a one-year window that ends at the beginning of the measurement window for our crash risk 
variables. Following Cheng and Lo (2006), we also include lagged insider sales (laglnetsales) to 
further control for unobserved factors that might be driving insider sales. As suggested by prior 
literature, insiders are inclined to trade on various bad news events. To control for this possibility, 
we further include in our regression future stock returns (leadret) and future trading volume 
(leadtradevol), which are measured in the same window as that of our crash risk variables. All the 
control variables are defined in the Appendix. Last, we include industry- and year-fixed effects in 
our regression model to control for any systematic variation in insider sales across industries and 
years. 
 
4.2 Tests of the hypotheses H2-H4 
For ease of interpretation of the coefficients and to mitigate measurement problems, we adopt 
subsample analyses to test the hypotheses H2-H4. H2 relates to the effect of firm financial 
constraints on crash-risk-based insider sales. In testing this hypothesis, we employ four proxies 
for financial constraints: (i) the WW index developed by Whited and Wu (2006), (ii) the HP index 
developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), (iii) the KZ index developed by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), and (iv) the dividend payout ratio used by Denis and Sibikov (2010). The WW index, HP 
index, and KZ index are coded in a way such that higher values represent greater financial 
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constraints. The dividend payout ratio runs in the opposite direction: higher dividend payout 
indicates lower financial constraints (Fazzari et al. 1988). Detailed definitions of these variables 
are given in the Appendix. We partition our full sample into two subsamples based on the sample 
medians of the WW index, HP index, and KZ index, respectively, and on an indicator variable for 
whether a firm has a dividend payout in the fiscal year. Then we estimate Model (1) separately for 
the two subsamples that are formed based on the four financial constraint indicators, respectively. 
If the hypothesis H2a (H2b) holds, the coefficient on crashrisk should be less (more) positive for 
the high-financial-constraint subsample than for the low-financial-constraint subsample.  
The hypothesis H3 is concerned with whether information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders moderates the relationship between insider sales and future crash risk. To test this 
hypothesis, we first split our full sample into two subsamples based on the sample medians of the 
measures of information asymmetry. Financial opacity (opacity) is used as the proxy for 
information asymmetry and is measured as per Hutton et al. (2009). High financial opacity 
indicates high information asymmetry. We estimate Model (1) separately for the two subsamples. 
The hypothesis H3 predicts that the coefficient on crashrisk for the high-information-asymmetry 
subsample is more positive than that for the low-information-asymmetry subsample.  
Finally, the hypothesis H4 explores whether SOX has a moderating effect on the relationship 
between insider sales and future crash risk. To test this hypothesis, we divide our full sample into 
two subsamples based on an indicator variable for whether a firm is in the pre- or post-SOX period, 
and then run Model (1) separately for these two subsamples.13 If the hypothesis H4 is supported, 
 
13 In testing the hypothesis H4, we exclude the financial crisis period 2007-2009 (e.g., Jaggi et al. 2010; Acharya 
et al. 2009; Adrian and Shin 2010) to eliminate the potential confounding effects of the crisis on crash-risk-based 
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crashrisk should have a more positive coefficient for the pre-SOX subsample than for the post-
SOX subsample.  
 
4.3 Accounting for endogeneity 
Insider trading, by itself, helps push stock prices towards fundamental value (Piotroski and 
Roulstone 2005), thus reverse causality might arise in the way that insider sales reduce stock price 
crash risk. However, this potential reverse causality relates to a negative, contemporaneous 
association between insider sales and crash risk, which is unlikely to explain the positive, lead-lag 
association between insider sales and crash risk, as predicted in the hypothesis H1. In particular, 
firm-specific stock price crashes are, fundamentally, triggered by a “burst-out” of accumulated 
withheld bad news (Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; He 2015). If managers withhold and 
accumulate bad news, the extent to which their stocks are overpriced will increase, with a 
consequential increase in stock price crash risk. If, on the contrary, managers release bad news 
when known, stock prices will move towards fundamental value on a timely basis, such that the 
degree of overpricing will be abated, and crash risk will fall. In a similar way, insider sales will 
move stock prices towards intrinsic value, thereby mitigating crash risk as well. Whereas a stock 
price crash might, occasionally, follow insider sales, in such a case, it would be the actual insider 
sales driving the stock price down towards fundamental value in the cross-section; as such, the 
likelihood of any future stock price crash will be reduced. Most importantly, our main results 
concern insider sales that are made on an average of 15-month-ahead crash risk, and hence are 
 
insider sales in the post-SOX sample period. 
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unlikely to be driven by any potential reverse causality which runs in the opposite direction to our 
prediction in the hypothesis H1.  
Another possible explanation for the hypothesis H1 is that, in order to profit from insider sales, 
managers might withhold bad news to achieve a higher stock price before insider sales, which 
increases the probability of a stock price crash. Nevertheless, managers only have the incentive to 
withhold bad news before their insider-sales transactions, and will no longer have such an 
incentive after they have sold down their stocks. For this reason, managerial incentives for insider 
selling cannot be used to proxy for actual insider sales in our study which is concerned with insider 
sales made on a relatively long horizon (i.e., 15-month-ahead on average), hence the alternative 
explanation is unlikely to hold. That said, to further alleviate potential endogeneity issues, we do 
an analysis of the impact threshold for a confounding variable method per Larcker and Rusticus 
(2010), and conduct a falsification test. Results are discussed in the next section.  
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Results for the hypotheses H1-H4 
Table 2 reports the regression results for the test of the association between insider sales and future 
stock price crash risk. The coefficient on crashrisk is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. A one-unit change in crashrisk leads to a change of 0.1783 in lnetsales, which accounts for 
around 3% of its mean value for our sample. This result supports the hypothesis H1 – insider sales 
are positively correlated with future crash risk. This suggests that insiders are able to assess the 
likelihood of the future stock price crash that results from bad news hoarding, and this motivates 
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insiders to sell their stocks in anticipation of high future crash risk. We check the robustness of our 
baseline regression results using our alternative measures of crash risk, ncskew and duvol, which 
are described earlier in Section 3.2. Results are reported in Columns (2) and (3), and our inferences 
remain unchanged. Most control variables have statistically significant coefficients with the 
expected signs.  
Table 3 reports the regression results for Model (1) estimated separately for our two 
subsamples comprising firms with high versus low financial constraints. The crashrisk coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant across all the low-financial-constraint subsamples (which 
are represented by dww=0, dhp=0, dkz=0, and dpayout=1, respectively). In contrast, the coefficient 
for crashrisk, albeit positive, is not statistically significant for the high-financial-constraint 
subsamples (represented by dww=1, dhp=1, dkz=1, and dpayout=0, respectively). These results 
indicate that the positive association between insider selling and future crash risk is evident only 
for firms that are in the low-financial-constraint subsample, thus lending support to the hypothesis 
H2a.  
 Table 4 presents the regression results for Model (1) run separately for the subsample firms 
with high versus low information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. dopacity=1 (0) 
represents the high- (low-) information-asymmetry subsample with above- (below-) median value 
of opacity, respectively. crashrisk has a highly significant, positive coefficient in the high-opacity 
(dopacity=1) subsample but a statistically insignificant coefficient (p=0.796) in the low-opacity 
(dopacity=0) subsample. These results suggest that the positive link between insider sales and 
future crash risk is more evident for firms that have high information asymmetry, thus consistent 
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with the hypothesis H3.  
Table 5 reports the regression results for the test of the hypothesis H4. Subsamples are formed 
based on whether firms are in the post-SOX or in the pre-SOX period. The coefficient for crashrisk 
in the pre-SOX (sox=0) subsample is positive and statistically significant (p=0.035), whereas the 
coefficient for crashrisk in the post-SOX (sox=1) subsample is only marginally significant (p= 
0.073).14 This finding suggests that insider sales are more strongly, positively associated with 
future crash risk before the implementation of SOX, and is also consistent with Hutton et al. (2009) 
who find that the positive association between financial opacity and future crash risk subsides in 
the post-SOX era.  
 
5.2 Results for coping with potential endogeneity 
In all the multivariate tests that we have conducted thus far, we control not only for an extensive 
set of variables that are potentially correlated with both insider sales and future crash risk, but also 
for industry-fixed effects. But we cannot completely exclude the possibility that our regression 
analysis still omits some variable(s) that might drive both insider sales and crash risk. To address 
this concern, we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010) to conduct the Impact Threshold for a 
Confounding Variable (ITCV) test. Bias induced by an omitted variable is determined by its 
correlations with the key independent variable and with the dependent variable, and can be 
appraised by the impact threshold for a confounding variable (ITCV). The ITCV is defined as the 
minimum value of the product of two correlations (i.e., the partial correlation between the 
 
14 Option grant data in Compustat are missing for almost all firm-year observations for the years before the 
passage of SOX. Hence, we do not include the optiong variable in the multivariate test of the hypothesis H4.  
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dependent variable and the confounding variable, and the partial correlation between the key 
independent variable and the confounding variable) that would cause the observed statistical 
relation between the key independent variable and the dependent variable to become statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level. Using the ITCV, we can gauge how strong the confounding effect 
would have to be to invalidate our results and inferences should an omitted variable have been 
controlled in the regression model (Frank 2000). The larger the value of ITCV, the less susceptible 
our regression results are to potential omitted-variable(s) bias. Table 6 reports the results of our 
ITCV test. The ITCV is estimated to be 0.0075, which is higher than the absolute value of the 
impact factor (Impact) of all the control variables (except the lagged dependent variable, 
laglnetsales) used in Model (1). This result provides assurance that our findings relating to our 
main hypothesis H1 are robust to the potential correlated-omitted-variable(s) problem.  
To lend more credence to our baseline regression results, we also conduct a placebo test. 
Specifically, we look at stock trades made by non-officer employees who are unlikely to affect 
major corporate decisions. If any correlated omitted variable, or reverse causality, were driving 
our main results, we should find a significant association between non-officer employees’ stock 
sales and future stock price crash risk. However, as shown in Table 7, we fail to find any such 
result, thereby rendering it unlikely that our main results are driven by omitted variables or reverse 
causality.  
 
6 Additional analysis 
In our main tests, we link insider sales with future crash risk on a 15-month-ahead horizon. In this 
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section, we conduct longer-horizon tests of the hypothesis H1 by moving the measurement window 
of future crash risk beyond 15 months. Specifically, we link insider sales to 27-month-ahead crash 
risk.15 Part (b) of Figure 1 presents the timeline for our measurement windows of insider sales 
and of 27-month-ahead crash risk.16 We replace lnetsales with laglnetsales on the left-hand side 
of Model (1), substitute laglnetsales for llaglnetsales on the right-hand side of the equation, and 
re-run the regression model.  
Table 8 reports the regression results. The coefficient on crashrisk has the predicted positive 
sign but is statistically significant only at the 10% level (p=0.083). A one-unit increase in crashrisk 
leads to an increase of 0.1397 in laglnetsales, which is equivalent to approximately 2.2% of its 
mean value in our sample. Collectively, we find relatively weaker evidence on insider sales that 
are made based on 27-month-ahead crash risk than on 15-month-ahead crash risk. This suggests 
that insiders are less able to forecast and trade on longer-term future crash risk. Such results and 
inferences are robust to running the ITCV and placebo tests covered in the previous section.  
 
7 Discussion and conclusion 
7.1 Implications of our findings 
Crash-risk-based insider trades profit insiders at the expense of outside investors. This reinforces 
the need to deter such inequitable trades. As noted earlier, insider sales made based on future crash 
risk at a relatively long horizon are hard to see through and/or litigate against, not only because it 
 
15 In parallel with footnote 12, we also find evidence (results not tabulated for brevity) that insider sales are 
positively associated with 2-year-ahead stock price crash risk.  
16 In un-tabulated tests, we expand our measurement window of future crash risk from 1-year duration to 2-year, 
which commences 3 months after the end of the measurement window for insider sales. Our inferences remain 
similar for using this alternative measure of future crash risk.  
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is usually hard for investors to distinguish and authenticate information-driven sales from 
liquidity- or diversification-driven sales, but also because the extent of future crash risk is subject 
to considerable uncertainty. Therefore, it is difficult to inhibit such insider trading activities directly. 
However, they can be curbed indirectly. Theory (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985; 
Huddart and Ke 2007) suggests that insider trades will be profitable to insiders only when 
information asymmetry exists between insiders and outsiders. In our case, if future stock price 
crash risk is assessed equally well by insiders vis-à-vis outsiders, insider trades based on future 
crash risk will be unprofitable to insiders and could thus be disincentivized. One way to put 
outsiders in an equal position to insiders in assessing future crash risk is to mandate managers to 
disclose their inside information in a complete, accurate, precise, and timely manner. Given the 
prevalence and significance of crash-risk-based insider sales as documented in our study, it is 
imperative for not only regulators but also firm shareholders to require managers to commit to full, 
timely, and accurate disclosures of corporate news to the market irrespective of the nature of the 
news. 
 
7.2 Concluding remarks 
This study examines whether managers sell their stocks based on future stock price crash risk. To 
our best knowledge, this paper is the first to address this issue directly in the literature. We find 
that insider sales are positively associated with future crash risk, which is consistent with insiders 
being able to assess future crash risk and to exploit this informational advantage for personal gain. 
We also find that the positive association between insider sales and future crash risk is more 
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evident for firms that have high information opacity but less evident for firms that are financially 
constrained or in the post-SOX era. Our study sheds new light on crash-risk-based insider trades 
which circumvent extant legal disciplines, and offers insights on how such informed trades may 
plausibly be curbed in practice.  
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Appendix: Summary of variable definitions 
 
 
Variables Definitions 
crashrisk 1 if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 
standard deviations below the mean of firm-specific weekly returns in a 
fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Our firm-specific weekly returns measure 
follows Kim et al. (2011a). 
ncskew The negative of the third moment of each stock’s firm-specific daily returns 
following Chen et al. (2001). 
duvol The standard deviation of “down”-week firm-specific weekly returns 
(scaled by the number of “down”-weeks minus 1), divided by the standard 
deviation of “up”-week firm-specific weekly returns (scaled by the number 
of “up”-weeks minus 1) over a fiscal year. The firm-specific weekly returns 
measure follows Kim et al. (2011a). 
lnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., 
insider sales minus insider purchases) made by all the directors and officers 
over a year ending 3 months prior to the beginning of the year for which 
crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the volume 
amount of the net insider sales is negative. 
laglnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., 
insider sales minus insider purchases) made by all the directors and officers 
in the year ending 15 months prior to the beginning of the year for which 
crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the volume 
amount of the net insider sales is negative. 
llaglnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., 
insider sales minus insider purchases) made by all the directors and officers 
in the year ending 27 months prior to the beginning of the year for which 
crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the volume 
amount of the net insider sales is negative. 
nonofficerlnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., 
insider sales minus insider purchases) made by all the non-officer 
employees over a year ending 3 months prior to the beginning of year for 
which crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the 
volume amount of the net insider sales is negative. 
nonofficerlaglnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., 
insider sales minus insider purchases) made by all the non-officer 
employees over a year ending 15 months prior to the beginning of year for 
which crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the 
volume amount of the net insider sales is negative. 
hp A financial constraint index (hp) developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). 
hp=-0.737*totassets+0.043*totassets2-0.040*age, where totassets is the 
natural logarithm of total assets capped at $4.5 billion, and age is the 
number of years for which a firm has been listed. 
ww A financial constraint index (ww) developed by Whited and Wu (2006). 
ww=-0.091*cash_flow/ta-0.062*dividend_dummy+0.021*ltd/ta-
0.044*totassets+0.102*industry_sales_growth-0.035*sales_growth, 
where cash_flow is cash flow from operations divided by lagged total 
assets, dividend_dummy equals 1 if a firm has paid dividends, and 0 
otherwise, ltd/ta is the ratio of long-term debt to lagged total assets, 
totassets is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets, 
industry_sales_growth is annual growth of industry sales at the three-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level, and sales_growth is annual 
change in sales divided by lagged sales.  
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kz A financial constraint index (kz) developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
kz=-1.002*(cf/ta)-39.368*(div/ta)-1.315*(ca/ta)+3.139*lev+0.283*mtb, 
where cf/ta is the ratio of cash flow to lagged book assets, div/ta is the ratio 
of cash dividends to lagged book assets, ca/ta is the ratio of cash balance 
to lagged book assets, lev is the ratio of total debt to book assets, and mtb 
is the market-to-book ratio. 
payout The dividend payout ratio, which equals dividend payout divided by 
earnings before interests and taxes. 
changeroa Return on assets for the next fiscal year divided by that for the current fiscal 
year. 
roa Return on assets at the end of the next fiscal year. 
salesgrowth Sales revenues for the current fiscal year minus sales revenues for the 
previous fiscal year, scaled by sales revenues for the previous fiscal year.  
optiong The number of options grants at the end of the fiscal year. 
ret Buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of a firm in the fiscal year, which is 
measured in the same window as our insider sales variable (i.e., lnetsales) 
is 
leadret Buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of a firm in the fiscal year, which is 
measured in the same window as our crash risk variables (i.e., crashrisk, 
ncskew, and duvol) are.  
size The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s equity at the end of 
the fiscal year. 
btm The book value of firm equity divided by the market value of firm equity 
at the end of the fiscal year. 
tradevol Daily dollar trading volume (i.e., the closing price at a given date times the 
number of shares traded at that date) (in millions of U.S dollars) averaged 
over a fiscal year for a firm. tradevol is measured in the same window as 
that of our insider sales variable (i.e., lnetsales). 
leadtradevol Daily dollar trading volume (i.e., the closing price at a given date times the 
number of shares traded at that date) (in millions of U.S dollars) averaged 
over a fiscal year for a firm. leadtradevol is measured in the same window 
as that of our crash risk variables (i.e., crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol). 
anacov The number of analysts that make at least one earnings forecast for a firm 
in the fiscal year. 
dedi Dedicated institutional investors’ stock ownership as a percentage of a 
firm’s outstanding shares at the end of the fiscal year.  
sox 0 if a firm is in the pre-SOX period (i.e., years 1993-2002), and 1 if a firm 
is in the post-SOX period (i.e., years 2003-2013), which excludes the 
financial crisis period 2007-2009. 
retvol The standard deviation of daily market excess return over a 12-month 
period ending at the end of the fiscal year. 
opacity The three-year moving sum of the absolute value of annual abnormal 
accruals, a measure of financial opacity developed by Hutton et al. (2009). 
stdearnings The standard deviation of income before extraordinary items in the current 
and previous four fiscal years.  
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Fig. 1  Timeline for the measures of insider sales and crash risk 
 
(a) The association between insider sales and 15-month-ahead crash risk 
Notes: Figure (a) shows the timeline for measurements of the dependent variable (i.e., lnetsales) and the key 
independent variable (i.e., crashrisk) that are used for the multivariate tests of the hypotheses H1-H4. Both the 
crash risk variable and insider selling variable are defined in the Appendix.  
 
 
 
(b) The association between insider sales and 27-month-ahead crash risk 
Notes: Figure (b) shows the timeline for measurements of the dependent variable (i.e., laglnetsales) and the 
key independent variable (i.e., crashrisk) that are used for the test of the association between insider sales 
and 27-month-ahead crash risk. Both the crash risk variable and insider selling variable are defined in the 
Appendix.  
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Table 1  Summary statistics  
Variables 
No. of 
firm-years 
No. of 
unique firms 
Mean Std.dev. 25th Median 75th 
lnetsales 32,326 7,135 6.0513 6.0302 0 7.6014 11.9184 
laglnetsales 32,326 7,135 5.5796 6.0249 0 0 11.7166 
llaglnetsales 32,326 7,135 5.0925 5.9900 0 0 11.5090 
lllaglnetsales 32,326 7,135 4.6237 5.9120 0 0 11.2077 
crashrisk 32,326 7,135 0.1791 0.3834 0 0 0 
ncskew 32,326 7,135 -5.1003 18.1146 -12.3201 -4.4734 3.0900 
duvol 32,326 7,135 -0.1773 0.4339 -0.4119 -0.1523 0.0849 
changeroa 32,326 7,135 -0.0214 1.3579 -0.0314 -0.0011 0.0203 
roa 32,326 7,135 0.0256 1.9649 -0.0049 0.0357 0.0734 
retvol 32,326 7,135 0.1305 0.0979 0.0725 0.1065 0.1571 
sales_growth 32,326 7,135 0.6130 66.2252 -0.0454 0.0675 0.2051 
optiong 32,326 7,135 2.5428 8.0249 0 0 1.3 
size 32,326 7,135 6.0937 2.0959 4.6585 6.1764 7.4993 
btm 32,326 7,135 0.9334 5.9271 0.3153 0.5442 0.9038 
ret 32,326 7,135 0.0148 0.6886 -0.2998 -0.0597 0.1897 
tradvol 32,326 7,135 1.3851 1.4487 0.4066 0.8935 1.8417 
leadret 32,326 7,135 -0.0045 0.7120 -0.3282 -0.0689 0.1876 
leadtradvol 32,326 7,135 1.4281 1.7546 0.4157 0.9036 1.8464 
anacov 32,326 7,135 31.8642 43.0978 1 17 44 
hp 32,326 7,135 -1004.1310 1181.3660 -1554.8140 -418.0119 -104.5542 
kz 23,479 5,932 1.0763 11.2736 0.4347 0.8256 1.2595 
ww 32,326 7,135 -0.2357 2.3346 -0.2887 -0.2198 -0.1506 
payout 11,074 3,201 0.0796 27.4089 0 0.1448 0.4080 
stdearnings 32,326 7,135 94.1098 943.266
8 
3.4301 11.2160 40.7433 
opacity 23,208 5,680 18.7112 336.6337 0.0525 0.1313 0.4598 
dedi 32,326 7,135 0.0581 0.0846 0 0.0242 0.0920 
sox 32,326 7,135 0.5420 0.4982 0 1 1 
Notes: This table tabulates the descriptive statistics of all the variables used for the hypothesis tests. The sample period 
ranges from 1993 to 2013. All the variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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Table 2  Test of H1: the association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk 
 
Variables Dependent variable = lnetsales 
 
Pred. Sign   (1)  (2) (3)  
Intercept ? 
 
0.2553 
 
0.3555* 0.4217** 
 
  
(0.217) 
 
(0.088) (0.045) 
 
crashrisk + 
 
0.1783** 
    
  
(0.012) 
    
ncskew + 
   
0.0052*** 
  
    
(<0.001) 
  
duvol + 
    
0.2874*** 
 
     
(<0.001) 
 
changeroa - 
 
-0.0196 
 
-0.0197 -0.0215* 
 
  
(0.106) 
 
(0.102) (0.078) 
 
roa - 
 
-0.0183** 
 
-0.0183** -0.0192*** 
 
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) (0.010) 
 
retvol + 
 
-1.1809*** 
 
-1.2120*** -1.0538*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.003) 
 
salesgrowth + 
 
0.0118 
 
0.0118 0.0119 
 
  
(0.168) 
 
(0.167) (0.167) 
 
optiong + 
 
0.0213*** 
 
0.0216*** 0.0216*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
size + 
 
0.4465*** 
 
0.4402*** 0.4301*** 
 
  
(<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
btm + 
 
-0.0009 
 
-0.0008 -0.0010 
 
   
(0.784) 
 
(0.821) (0.780) 
 
ret - 
 
0.8955*** 
 
0.8955*** 0.8892*** 
 
  
(<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
tradevol + 
 
0.2653*** 
 
0.2653*** 0.2620*** 
 
  
(<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
leadret -  -0.0472  -0.0455 -0.0297  
  (0.192)  (0.207) (0.415)  
leadtradevol +  0.0412*  0.0430* 0.0468**  
   (0.081)  (0.068) (0.048)  
anacov - 0.0041*** 0.0040*** 0.0042***   
(<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
laglnetsales + 
 
0.4710*** 
 
0.4710*** 0.4710*** 
 
  
(<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
stdearnings +  -0.0001*  -0.0001* -0.0001*  
  (0.094)  (0.094) (0.098)  
ww -  0.3452  0.3449 0.3462  
   (0.160)  (0.159) (0.160)  
dedi -  3.3248***  3.3284*** 3.3109***  
   (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001)  
sox -  -0.2599  -0.2589 -0.2690  
   (0.285)  (0.286) (0.268)  
Year-fixed effects   included  included included  
Industry-fixed 
effects 
  included  included included  
       R-squared 
  
0.4088 
 
0.4089 0.4090 
 
Num. of observations 
  
32,326 
 
32,326 32,326 
 
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the association between insider sales and future stock 
price crash risk. The sample period covers the years 1993-2013. The dependent variable is lnetsales. The key independent 
variables are crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol, three distinct proxies for stock price crash risk. All the variables in the table are 
defined in the Appendix. Year- and industry-fixed effects are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The 
industry-fixed effects are based on the industry dummies constructed from the first two digits of SIC codes. The p-values in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 3  Test of H2: the moderating effect of financial constraints          
Variables Dependent variable = lnetsales 
 
dww=0 dww=1   dhp=0 dhp=1   dkz=0 dkz=1   dpayout=0 dpayout=1 
intercept 0.6955* -0.4546*  0.8144* -0.4232* 
 
0.2098 0.0298 
 
0.4650 0.8731 
 (0.080) (0.073) 
 
(0.059) (0.092) 
 
(0.465) (0.928) 
 
(0.255) (0.120) 
crashrisk 0.2862*** -0.0186  0.2055** 0.0422 
 
0.2575** 0.0717 
 
0.2815 0.4115** 
 
(0.004) (0.851) 
 
(0.035) (0.678) 
 
(0.024) (0.531)  (0.135) (0.015) 
changeroa -0.0141 -0.0091  -0.0335 -0.0164* 
 
0.0087 -0.0292* 
 
-0.0233 0.7835 
 
(0.741) (0.351) 
 
(0.351) (0.071) 
 
(0.745) (0.080) 
 
(0.858) (0.331) 
roa 0.1651* -0.0297***  3.0972*** -0.0258*** 
 
0.6575*** -0.0263*** 
 
0.2972 0.3566 
 
(0.087) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.008) (<0.001) 
 
(0.193) (0.468) 
retvol -2.8227*** -0.5522  -1.7359** -1.0220*** 
 
-0.1638 -1.6573*** 
 
-1.1157 1.2710 
 (<0.001) (0.162) 
 
(0.042) (0.008) 
 
(0.773) (0.003) 
 
(0.141) (0.449) 
salesgrowth -0.0002*** 0.0443**  0.0024 -0.0003*** 
 
-0.0012 -0.0002*** 
 
-0.0794** -0.0885*** 
 (<0.001) (0.022) 
 
(0.427) (<0.001) 
 
(0.949) (<0.001) 
 
(0.012) (0.003) 
optiong 0.0110** 0.0703***  0.0098** 0.0915*** 
 
0.0314*** 0.0215*** 
 
0.0295 -0.0036 
 (0.016) (<0.001) 
 
(0.028) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.174) (0.831) 
size 0.3024*** 0.7084***  0.2589*** 0.7041*** 
 
0.5012*** 0.5532*** 
 
0.3588*** 0.1472*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (0.004) 
btm -0.0043 0.0031***  -0.0061 0.0037*** 
 
-0.0383 0.0060 
 
-0.0116 -0.0461 
 (0.784) (<0.001) 
 
(0.685) (<0.001) 
 
(0.106) (0.730) 
 
(0.652) (0.118) 
ret 1.5107*** 0.5777***  1.4877*** 0.5705*** 
 
0.8802*** 0.8242*** 
 
0.7681*** 1.7029*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
tradevol 0.1869*** 0.2862***  0.1028** 0.3198*** 
 
0.3038*** 0.1798*** 
 
0.3037*** -0.0128 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.041) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (0.937) 
leadret -0.0802 -0.0321  -0.0273 -0.0406  -0.1177** -0.0693  0.0566 0.2097 
 (0.304) (0.428)  (0.684) (0.340)  (0.028) (0.268)  (0.350) (0.182) 
leadtradevol -0.0001 0.0492*  0.0431 0.0486**  -0.0204 0.1483***  0.0308 0.2377* 
 (0.998) (0.061)  (0.315) (0.049)  (0.483) (0.001)  (0.663) (0.087) 
anacov 0.0065*** 0.0134***  0.0070*** 0.0183*** 
 
0.0042*** 0.0022 
 
0.0095*** 0.0110*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.009) (0.138) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
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laglnetsales 0.5315*** 0.3875***  0.5277*** 0.3826*** 
 
0.4363*** 0.4384*** 
 
0.4997*** 0.5859*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
stdearnings -0.0001 -0.0024***  -4.57E-05 -0.0008 
 
-0.0001 -0.0004*** 
 
-0.0004** -0.0001 
 (0.148) (0.005)  (0.205) (0.136)  (0.112) (<0.001)  (0.031) (0.371) 
dedi 3.6907*** 2.3207***  3.5786*** 2.3707*** 
 
1.3742** 2.2776*** 
 
4.3614*** 6.3000*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (0.034) (<0.001)  (0.002) (<0.001) 
sox 0.3692 -0.4341  -0.2175 -0.1101 
 
-0.0786 0.7783** 
 
0.4012 0.7226 
 (0.307) (0.151)  (0.604) (0.738) 
 
(0.811) (0.017) 
 
(0.770) (0.569) 
Year-fixed effects included included  included included  included included  included included 
Industry-fixed effects included included  included included  included included  included included 
            
R-squared 0.4374 0.3684 
 
0.4340 0.3461  0.4093 0.4112  0.4073 0.4655 
Num. of observations 16,163 16,163 
 
16,163 16,163 
 
11,740 11,739 
 
5,537 5,537 
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the hypothesis H2 as regards the moderating effect of financial constraints on the association between insider sales and future stock 
price crash risk. The sample period ranges from 1993 to 2013. The dependent variable is lnetsales. The key independent variable is crashrisk. The moderator variable pertains to financial constraints 
which are proxied by hp, ww, kz, and payout, respectively. The full sample is split into two subsamples based on dhp, dww, dkz, and dpayout, respectively. dhp, dww, and dkz are the indicators for 
the sample medians of hp, ww, and kz, respectively. dpayout equals 1 if a firm makes a dividend payout in a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. dhp, dww, and dkz equal 1 for the high-financial-constraint 
subsample, and 0 for the low-financial-constraint subsample. By contrast, dpayout equals 1 for the low-financial-constraint subsample, and 0 for the high-financial-constraint subsample. All the 
variables in the table are defined in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are included but not reported for simplicity. The industry-fixed effects are based on the industry dummies constructed 
from the first two digits of SIC codes. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-
tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4  Test of H3: the moderating effect of information asymmetry 
 
Variables   Dependent variable = lnetsales 
   dopacity=0 dopacity=1 
Intercept 
 
0.9252** -0.7530**  
(0.021) (0.015) 
crashrisk 
 
0.0320 0.3332*** 
 
 
(0.796) (0.003) 
changeroa 
 
0.0086 -0.0127  
(0.719) (0.225) 
roa 
 
0.1661*** -0.0325*** 
 
 
(0.001) (<0.001) 
retvol 
 
-1.8936*** -1.1386** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.021) 
salesgrowth 
 
0.0801 0.1439***  
(0.126) (<0.001) 
optiong 
 
0.0330*** 0.0165*  
(0.001) (0.068) 
size 
 
0.4392*** 0.6849*** 
 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
btm 
 
0.0025* -0.0108 
 
 
(0.070) (0.311) 
ret 
 
1.1067*** 0.6120*** 
 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
tradevol 
 
0.2388*** 0.2717*** 
 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
leadret  0.0260 -0.0197 
  (0.729) (0.702) 
leadtradevol  0.0060 0.0657** 
  (0.917) (0.026) 
anacov 
 
0.0069*** 0.0032** 
 
 
(<0.001) (0.034) 
laglnetsales 
 
0.4906*** 0.4500***  
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
stdearnings  -0.0001*** -0.0001 
 (0.002) (0.198) 
ww 
 
3.1971** 4.1194*** 
 
 
(0.038) (<0.001) 
dedi 
 
4.1739*** 4.0897*** 
 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
sox 
 
0.8249* 0.4590 
 
 
(0.078) (0.215) 
Year-fixed effects 
 
included included 
Industry-fixed effects  included included 
R-squared 
 
0.4091 0.4183 
Num. of observations 
 
11,604 11,604 
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the hypothesis H3 as regards the moderating effect of 
information asymmetry on the association between insider sales and future crash risk. The sample period ranges from 1993 to 
2013. The dependent variable is lnetsales. The key independent variable is crashrisk. The moderator variable pertains to 
information asymmetry which is proxied by opacity. The full sample is split into two subsamples separated by dopacity, a 
binary variable constructed based on the sample median of opacity. All the variables in the table are defined in the Appendix. 
Year and industry dummies are included but not reported for brevity. The industry-fixed effects are based on the industry 
dummies constructed from the first two digits of SIC codes. The p-values in brackets are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5  Test of H4: the moderating effect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
 
Variables   Dependent variable = lnetsales 
  sox=0 sox=1 
Intercept  0.0115 0.6841** 
  (0.961) (0.021) 
crashrisk  0.2337** 0.1886* 
  (0.035) (0.073) 
changeroa  0.0813 -0.0505 
 
 (0.288) (0.106) 
roa  0.2476* -0.0278*** 
  (0.069) (<0.001) 
retvol  0.5132 -4.2329*** 
 
 (0.301) (<0.001) 
salesgrowth  -0.0093 0.0358 
 
 (0.245) (0.110) 
size  0.3121*** 0.6185*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
btm  -0.0021 -0.0199 
  (0.462) (0.542) 
ret  0.5745*** 1.0681*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
tradevol  0.4471*** 0.2981*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
leadret  -0.0410 -0.0389 
  (0.405) (0.627) 
leadtradevol  0.0934 0.0839*** 
  (0.114) (0.005) 
anacov  0.0102*** -0.0004 
  (<0.001) (0.789) 
laglnetsales  0.4838*** 0.4584*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
stdearnings  -2.37E-05 -0.0001*** 
  (0.287) (0.001) 
ww  0.1974 1.0062* 
  (0.195) (0.095) 
dedi  6.0705*** 1.1341** 
  (<0.001) (0.041) 
Year-fixed effects  included included 
Industry-fixed effects  included included 
    
R-squared  0.3530 0.4191 
Num. of observations  14,804 11,915 
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the hypothesis H4 as to the moderating effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) on the association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk. The sample period ranges from 
1993 to 2013, excluding the financial crisis period 2007-2009. The dependent variable is lnetsales. The key independent 
variable is crashrisk. The moderator variable is sox. The full sample is split into two subsamples based on sox. All the variables 
in the table are defined in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are included but not reported for brevity. The industry-
fixed effects are based on the industry dummies constructed from the first two digits of SIC codes. The p-values in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels 
(two-tailed), respectively.
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Table 6  Impact threshold for a confounding variable for the test of the association between insider sales and future crash risk 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ITCV 
ITCV implied 
correlations 
(x, crashrisk) (x, lnetsales) Impactraw (x crashriskz) (x lnetsalesz) Impact 
crashrisk 0.0075 0.0866       
changeroa   -0.0018 -0.0001 0.0000002 0.0034 -0.0069 -0.000023 
roa   0.0058 0.0036 0.0000209 0.0029 -0.0081 -0.000023 
retvol   -0.0105 -0.1127 0.0011834 -0.0099 -0.0391 0.000387 
salesgrowth   0.0126 -0.0059 -0.0000743 0.0078 0.0217 0.000169 
optiong   0.0447 0.2051 0.0091680 0.0162 0.0319 0.000517 
size   0.0503 0.3974 0.0199892 0.0347 0.1304 0.004525 
btm   -0.0134 -0.0441 0.0005909 -0.0045 -0.0021 0.000009 
ret   0.0205 0.1364 0.0027962 -0.0017 0.1324 -0.000225 
tradevol   0.0611 0.2853 0.0174318 -0.0097 0.0483 -0.000469 
leadret   -0.1329 0.0023 -0.0003057 -0.1420 -0.0103 0.001463 
leadtradevol   0.0802 0.2374 0.0190395 0.0639 0.0131 0.000837 
anacov   0.0108 0.3325 0.0035910 -0.0471 0.0191 -0.000900 
laglnetsales   0.0529 0.5758 0.0304598 0.0247 0.4723 0.011666 
stdearnings   -0.0108 0.0293 -0.0003164 -0.0138 -0.0180 0.000248 
ww   -0.0122 -0.0024 0.0000293 0.0063 0.0221 0.000139 
dedi   0.0094 0.1890 0.0017766 -0.0090 0.0577 -0.000519 
sox   0.0773 0.2348 0.0181500 0.0464 0.0384 0.001782  
        
Mean 
  
0.0144 0.1449 0.007266 -0.0018 0.0531 0.001152 
Max     0.0802 0.5758 0.030460 0.0639 0.4723 0.011666 
Notes: This table reports the impact of possible correlated omitted variables on the results for the multivariate test of the association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk. The 
sample period covers the years 1993-2013. The dependent variable is lnetsales. The key independent variable is crashrisk. Column (1) reports the impact threshold for a confounding variable 
(ITCV), which is the lowest product of the partial correlation between the dependent variable and the confounding variable and the partial correlation between the key independent variable and the 
confounding variable that causes the coefficient for crashrisk to be statistically insignificant. Column (2) reports the implied minimum correlation a confounding variable must have with the 
dependent variable and crashrisk to make the coefficient for crashrisk statistically insignificant. Column (3) presents the raw correlations between crashrisk and each control variable in our 
regression model (1). Column (4) reports the raw correlations between the dependent variable and each control variable in our regression model (1). Column (5) shows each control variable’s raw 
impact, which is defined as the product of the two raw correlations that are reported in Column (3) and Column (4), respectively. Column (6) reports the partial correlations between crashrisk and 
each control variable in our regression model (1). Column (7) presents the partial correlations between the dependent variable and each control variable in our regression model (1). Column (8) is 
each control variable’s partial impact, which is defined as the product of the two partial correlations that are reported in Column (6) and Column (7), respectively. 
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Table 7  Placebo test: the association between non-officer employees’ stock sales and future 
stock price crash risk 
  
Variables Dependent variable = nonofficerlnetsales 
Intercept  -0.0768 
 
 
 
 (0.741) 
 
 
crashrisk  0.0611 
 
 
 
 (0.374) 
 
 
changeroa  0.0040 
 
 
 
 (0.405) 
 
 
roa  -0.0029 
 
 
 
 (0.511) 
 
 
retvol  0.2382 
 
 
  (0.476) 
 
 
salesgrowth  0.0024 
 
 
  (0.422) 
 
 
optiong  0.0144* 
 
 
  (0.050) 
 
 
size  0.2642*** 
 
 
  (<0.001) 
 
 
btm  0.0019  
 
  (0.487) 
 
 
ret  0.3056*** 
 
 
  (<0.001) 
 
 
tradevol  0.1515*** 
 
 
  (<0.001) 
 
 
leadret  0.0147   
  (0.682)   
leadtradevol  0.0891***   
  (0.001)   
anacov  -0.0005  
 
  (0.726) 
 
 
nonofficerlaglnetsales  -0.1205*** 
 
 
 (<0.001)  
 
stdearnings  -0.0001** 
 
 
 (0.035)  
 
ww  0.0722 
 
 
  (0.404)  
 
dedi  2.3204*** 
 
 
  (<0.001) 
 
 
sox  0.0651  
 
  (0.710)  
 
Year-fixed effects  included   
Industry-fixed effects  included   
     R-squared  0.1298 
 
Num. of observations  32,326 
 
 
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results for the placebo test which explores the association between non-officer 
employees’ stock sales and future stock price crash risk. The sample period covers the years 1993-2013. The dependent 
variable is nonofficerlnetsales. The key independent variable is crashrisk. All the variables in the table are defined in the 
Appendix. Year- and industry-fixed effects are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The industry-fixed 
effects are based on the industry dummies constructed from the first two digits of SIC codes. The p-values in parentheses are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels 
(two-tailed), respectively.  
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Table 8  Additional test: the association between insider sales and 27-month-ahead stock 
price crash risk 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable =laglnetsales 
        (27 months ahead) 
Intercept  -1.9435***  
 (0.000) 
crashrisk  0.1397*  
 (0.083) 
changeroa  -0.0334*  
 (0.092) 
roa  -0.0202**  
 (0.023) 
retvol  -0.7105  
 (0.112) 
salesgrowth  0.0069  
 (0.392) 
optiong  0.0203***  
 (0.001) 
size  0.4411***  
 (<0.001) 
btm  -0.0008  
 (0.787) 
ret  0.7774***  
 (<0.001) 
tradevol  0.1720***  
 (<0.001) 
leadret  0.0180 
  (0.739) 
leadtradevol  0.0604** 
  (0.025) 
anacov  0.0049***  
 (<0.001) 
llaglnetsales  0.4757***  
 (<0.001) 
stdearnings  -0.0002***  
 (0.002) 
ww  0.2924  
 (0.173) 
dedi  3.4802***  
 (<0.001) 
sox  1.9482***  
 (<0.001) 
Year-fixed effects  included 
Industry-fixed effects  included 
   R-squared  0.4030 
Num. of observations  25,106 
Notes: This table shows the OLS regression result for the test of the association between insider sales and 27- month-ahead 
stock price crash risk. The sample period covers the years 1993-2013. The dependent variable is laglnetsales, and the key 
independent variable is crashrisk. All the variables in the table are defined in the Appendix. Year- and industry-fixed effects 
are included in the regressions but not reported for brevity. The industry-fixed effects are based on the industry dummies 
constructed from the first two digits of SIC codes. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
